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Abstract
This paper explores the link between the presence of unions in the workplace, the adoption of
decentralized labor agreements and technical efficiency, using a relatively new methodology and a
large sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We apply the Data Envelopment Analysis, and its
robust version based on bootstrap theory, to get reliable estimates of technical efficiency at the firm
level in a standard first stage. We devote particular attention to the specific technology adopted,
by distinguishing 20 different sector frontiers, as well as to the presence of outliers. The obtained
efficiency scores are analyzed in a second stage applying a truncated regression model estimated via
Maximum Likelihood, following the Simar and Wilson (2007) methodology. Our results highlight
that the presence of workplace unionization decreases the level of technical efficiency, while other
aspects limiting unions’ power such as a strong exposure to international markets, high debt levels
or the prevalence of flexible assets partially reduce the union negative effect. However, when firms
adopt decentralized labor contracts agreements, the effect on efficiency is positive and partially
compensates the unions’ effect. The results are robust to the inclusion of many firm characteristics
over which managers have no direct control and to different model specifications.
Keywords: Technical Efficiency, Unions, Decentralized bargaining, Truncated regression model.
1. Introduction
The ongoing debate on the Italian productivity crisis, in particular for the manufac-
turing industry, has been recently revived by a deep discussion on the alleged beneficial
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consequences of labor market reforms and the role of unions. In particular, the effect of
unions on firm’s productivity is one of the current hottest topic in Italy, with an increasing
attention devoted by media, fostered by the delicate discussion, at institutional level, on
the future role of unions. If, on the one hand, the business community, members of the
government and policy commentators often include unions among the factors behind the
Italian productivity crisis, employees and trade unionists, on the other hand, highlight their
fundamental role to protect workers’ rights and to promote cooperation and communication.
The debate on these aspects is not new, but the numerous contributions still fail to reach
an empirical consensus on the real effects of unions on firm productivity, in line with the
theory that identifies the so called two faces of unionism (Freeman and Medoff, 1984): the
monopoly face and the collective voice/institutional response face (CV/IR). The monopoly
face synthesizes the different adverse effects for the firms, based or not on wage aspects. On
the one hand, unions can engage in rent-seeking activities, raising labor costs and reducing
firms’ profitability. As discussed in the hold-up literature, unions’ opportunistic behavior
may translate into a tax on a firm’s capital investment and be detrimental to its innovation
activities (see Card et al., 2014, and Cardullo et al., 2015, for recent contributions on the
hold-up problem in OECD countries). On the other hand, the unions can take different ac-
tions that limit workplace flexibility, encourage restrictive work rules or weaken employees’
efforts (Kaufman, 2004). As a consequence, firms appear less flexible and adaptable to envi-
ronmental shocks, and this impacts negatively on productivity. For instance, the presence of
unions may limit a store’s opening hours and reduce its competitive advantage with respect
to non-unionized stores, which are therefore better able to adapt to new market trends. On
the contrary, the CV/IR face highlights how the presence of unions increases the commu-
nication channels between the workforce and the management, reinforcing the voice option
for employees1. The outcome is a reduction of dissatisfaction at the workplace, absenteeism
and turnover, with a general positive effect on productivity. In particular, containing excess
1The exit-voice dichotomy has been introduced by Hirschman (1970) and represents two sides of social
interactions: the voice option suggests how it is possible to discuss and to contribute to a better environment,
while the exit option represents a more radical choice of not discussing and exiting the relationship.
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worker turnover reduces human capital dispersion and training costs, and avoids the costly
expression of the exit option by the employees (Ton and Huckman, 2008).
If unions can be considered as promoters and main actors of the voice option, the adop-
tion of decentralized labor contract agreements (DLCAs), which integrate or derogate the
national and industry-wide collective agreements, may represent the effective means of voice
and imply a smoother conflict among employees and entrepreneurs. A general tendency
towards the decentralization of labor contract bargaining has been recently suggested by
the European Council2, for its potential positive effect on productivity. The latter should
stem from a better mix of wage settlements and more flexible terms in the organization
of labor, which should be able to increase the satisfaction of employees, their effort and
firm attachment, reduce turnover, as well as improve firm’s adaptability to changing market
conditions.
Although there is a widespread interest on the potential effects of increasing decentralized
bargaining, the recent scientific literature remains mainly focused on the influence of Perfor-
mance Related Pay (PRP) schemes, one of the main components of firm local agreements,
and investigates in particular their effect on productivity at the individual level (Bandiera et
al., 2005). However, the flexibility of wages, still limited in magnitude, is manly accepted and
adopted in a collective form, with a modest expected effect on productivity (e.g., Lucifora
and Origo, 2015; Gielen et al. 2010). In the Italian context, the majority of firms adopting
a decentralized contract also introduce a PRP scheme, typically on a collective basis, with a
potentially limited effect on the employees’ efforts. However, DLCAs can also sustain pro-
ductivity through other channels not directly linked to wages, like additional flexibility in
working hours and labor organization, and other clauses that increase trust and cooperation
among employees and managers. The recent case of FIAT (now FCA) that decided to exit
Confindustria (the main association representing manufacturing and service companies) and
consequently to leave behind the National Labor Contract Agreements (NCLA) in order to
apply more flexible (and mainly not wage-based) terms, represents a valid example of the
2See for example the recent Country-specific recommendations 2015 (Council recommendation, 14 July
2015; 2015/C 272/16).
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issue. Moreover, DLCAs are the direct instrument through which unions make the voice
option effective: they contribute to create a better working environment, to increase the
employees’ commitment with the firm and to favor a cooperative approach with the firms’
managers. On top of these aspects, a DLCA can also be considered as an instrument to
limit the monopoly face of unions and its opportunistic behavior, in that it formally specifies
wage and non-wage claims through a written contract over a relatively long period of time
(usually 3 years, and sometimes more). When the firm and the unions jointly discuss and
bargain over wages and numerous other aspects of the employment relation or the organi-
zation of labor - as is often the case for the DLCAs observed in practice - inefficiencies are
more likely to be avoided, compared to the outcomes obtained under a traditional monopoly
union setting (e.g., Bennett and Kaufman, 2007). In this respect, the presence of a decen-
tralized contract has a double face: on the one hand, it signals that the voice option has been
formally expressed, reducing conflicts and increasing cooperation between the counterparts;
on the other hand, it commits the union to a predetermined set of contractual terms (e.g.,
profit-sharing rules), thereby reducing uncertainty and the union’s ex-post opportunistic
behavior.
In this paper, we propose to revisit a traditional labor and industrial economics issue
using efficiency analysis, a methodology relatively new in these fields. In particular, we
compute firms’ inefficiency using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) framework, which
measures the capacity of obtaining output for any given input bundle with respect to the
reference frontier. The bulk of previous literature, better analyzed in the next section,
is mainly focused on labor productivity and estimates the effect of unions or performance
related pay on measures such as value added per employee or revenues per employees3. If the
impact of unionization and industrial relations can be straightforward on output obtained per
unit of labor, their relationship with the technical efficiency level, which considers a complete
input bundle, is more interesting. In fact, efficiency score are computed more coherently with
the technology, assuming a production function characterized by many inputs combined to
3Papers focusing on standard total factor productivity (TFP) represent an exception, too. See Morikawa
(2010) for a recent example.
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obtain outputs. The main advantage of the DEA approach is that the shape of this function,
which is unknown, is not imposed, but is derived by the observed input and output bundles
through linear programming techniques.
Using a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms observed over the years 2010-2012, we
study the impact of both unions and decentralized labor agreements on technical efficiency.
From a methodological point of view, we use a semi-parametric approach, which minimizes
misspecification issues in the technology definition and compensates the limits of purely
deterministic models (see Daraio and Simar, 2007 for a thorough reference). Our results show
a clear negative effect of workplace unionization on technical efficiency that remains stable
across all estimates; however, such a negative impact is roughly counterbalanced by a positive
effect related to the presence of decentralized labor contracts. The obtained results are robust
to the introduction of additional controls, as well as to the adoption of a propensity score
based method, which is aimed at reducing endogeneity concerns between technical efficiency
and unions or decentralized contracts. This paper represents one of the first attempts to
combine DEA, truncated regression and propensity score based methods. We also show
that the corporate strategies pursued by managers to limit the unions’ bargaining power
substantially affect the overall negative effect on efficiency. In fact, for firms characterized
by higher exposure to international markets, higher debt and more flexible assets (all factors
limiting the unions’ power) the impact of unions is, on average, 40% lower.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature on the role of unions and decentralized bargaining. Section 3 describes the DEA
model, the bias correction procedure and the second stage analysis. Section 4 presents the
database and section 5 illustrates our main results. Some general considerations and policy
implications conclude our work.
2. Literature review and background
The literature on the effect of unions on productivity, vast and mainly dated, identifies
two theoretical mechanisms, one leading to an increase of productivity and the other to
a productivity drop (Metcalf, 2003). On the one hand, unions can promote cooperation,
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monitoring and information sharing between the employees and the management, all fac-
tors acting as a stimulus for increasing effort and motivation and contributing to a better
workplace environment. On the other hand, they can lead to restrictive work practices,
adverse industrial relations, conflicts and rent seeking, factors that contribute to deteriorate
trust and cooperation between the employees and the managers, and to reduce investment
(hold-up problem) and productivity levels. Despite the wide empirical literature on the
relationship between unions and firms’ economic performance, a general consensus on the
negative impact of unions has been partially reached only as far as profits are concerned4,
while the effect of unions on productivity remains substantially uncertain. Many surveys
on this topic (see, for example, Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003; Kuhn, 1998; Wilson, 1995;
Addison and Hirsch, 1989), which mainly collect evidence from the US, fail in finding a
common direction on the effect of unions on productivity. The results of the estimates are
generally not stable and strongly influenced by the specificity of the sample, by the industrial
sectors considered and by the definition of productivity used.5
In continental Europe, the recent literature mainly analyzes the effect of work councils,
workplace representative bodies characterized by co-determination and bargaining power
at the plant level, rather than the generic effect of unionism. Analyzing German firms,
Schedlitzki (2002) finds that work councils have a positive, albeit poorly significant, effect
on labor productivity. Positive effects are also reported by Muller (2012 and 2015) and
Hu¨bler and Jirjahn (2003), who noticed that the impact is more pronounced in German
firms not covered by sectoral collective agreements. Instead, Fairris and Askenazy (2010),
using a sample of French firms, find a negligible impact on labor productivity from the
presence of work councils.
Results are mixed also for the rare works that focus on technical efficiency, rather than
labor productivity. Schank et al. (2004) estimate technical efficiency via stochastic frontier
4See, for some recent reviews, Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2009 and Bennet and Kaufman, 2007.
5Contradicting results are also reported in the non-US based literature. For example, Morikawa (2010)
analyzes a panel of Japanese firms, finding a 18% labor productivity premium and a 13% TFP premium
for unionized firms. Instead, Pencavel (2002) finds that for the UK after the 90’ the impact of unions on
productivity is negligible.
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analysis for a sample of German firms operating in 1993-1996, finding no significant difference
between the median efficiency of firms having a work council and their counterparts without
it. Chintrakarn and Chen (2010) estimate a parametric production frontier too, but at the
aggregate level, using information on manufacturing sectors in US states. They find mixed
results for the presence of unions, in that they are shown to increase efficiency, but to reduce
technical progress. The most relevant paper in the field of non-parametric technical efficiency
analysis is Greer (2009), who focuses on the air transportation sector. After estimating
efficiency via DEA, he runs a Tobit regression to analyze the determinants of technical
efficiency. While his findings suggest that union density does not affect technical efficiency,
the use of a very specific data-set on US airlines, as well as new methodological developments,
leave space for further investigations. Doucouliagos and Laroche (2006) propose another
application of DEA in the labor field, investigating the effect of human resource practices
on technical efficiency in a sample of French firms. Among other control variables, they
include a union dummy in a Tobit regression model aimed at explaining efficiency scores,
and find a strong negative effect for unionized firms, which appear to be approximately 13%
less efficient than non-unionized ones.
The effect of decentralized bargaining on productivity and other economic outcomes has
been treated only marginally in the literature, with the exception of the German experience
of pacts, plant-level agreements characterized by concessions from both bargaining partners,
employees and firms, that integrate or partially derogate the collective sectoral agreements.
The number of contributions is increasing, but the interest is limited to investigating whether
firms adopting the pacts differ in terms of labor productivity and investments in physical
capital. Bellmann et al. (2015) find an insignificant effect of pacts on investments using
firm level data in the period 2001-2010. On the contrary, Addison et al. (2015) find a
consistent and robust effect (+20%) on labor productivity for firms adopting pacts, using a
wide sample of German firms operating in 19 sectors, in the period 2006-2009.
Regarding the empirical evidence from Italy, the most recent and relevant works focus
on Flexible Pay Systems (FPS) such as Performance Related Pay (PRP), often foreseen by
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decentralized bargaining in order to gain wage flexibility6. Origo (2009), analyzing a panel
of firms operating in the metalworking sector in the years 1989-1997, finds a positive effect
of FPS on labor productivity (7-11%) using diff-in-diff estimators to account for endogenity
issues, which seems to be larger for highly unionized firms. Antonietti et al. (2014) investi-
gate the adoption of FPS, and find a positive effect on labor productivity, during the years
2009-2011. The authors use a sample of firms located in an Italian region (Emilia Romagna)
and control for endogeneity through a two-stage procedure7. Damiani et al. (2014) analyze
the direct link between PRP and labor productivity by applying a quantile regression (and
its IV extension) on the RIL-AIDA panel of manufacturing firms in the period 2005-2007-
2010, finding a positive effect on labor productivity (9.5%) that is substantially uniform and
significant across all the quantiles.8 Lucifora and Origo (2015), working on a sample of 3000
Italian firms operating in the metal engineering sector during the period 1989-1999, find a
positive, but rather limited effect (3-5%) of PRP on labor productivity.
Our paper complements this existing research in two main respects. First, we focus
more generally on technical efficiency, rather than on labor productivity. Second, we aim
at explicitly separating the productivity impact of workplace unionization per se, from the
effect of having formally signed a decentralized labor contract agreements.
2.1. Unions and decentralized contracts in Italy
Italy is characterized by a two-tier bargaining system, with a dominant sectoral tier
and a supplementary decentralized tier where bargaining is usually carried out at the com-
pany/local level.9 The main objectives of the sectoral agreements (National Collective Labor
Agreements, NCLAs) are to protect real wages and to set common economic and norma-
tive conditions for sectoral workers nationwide. At the decentralized level, it is possible
6In this case, PRP schemes are mainly introduced in collective form, in general linking wages to plant or
team performance.
7The Probit model in the first stage estimates the probability of being an adopter of FPS, while an OLS
regression in the second stage estimates its effect on labor productivity.
8Damiani and Ricci (2014) analyze the RIL-AIDA panel of Italian firms operating in manufacturing and
service industries in 2005-2007, and find a positive association between unions’ presence and the probability
of adopting decentralized contracts or PRP schemes.
9A territorial level (mostly at the province level) also exists, but is typically confined to particular
industries, e.g., construction and agriculture.
8
to negotiate performance and productivity-related wage increases. In addition, the second
level bargaining may address a number of additional matters, such as working hours, tasks,
employment training, labor organization and union relations, in order to gain flexibility for
organizational changes and competitiveness (Devicienti et al. 2015).10 Application to all
workers in the firm of the conditions arrived at through bargaining at the decentralized level
is the standard practice. Second-level bargaining is subject to the limits and provisions
defined by the specific NCLAs applied in the productive unit.11
Italian law gives the workers the right to join a union, engage in union activity and
organize a plant-level union representation structure. The main workplace representation
body is the so-called unitary workplace union structures (Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie,
RSU). The RSU includes features of works councils (e.g., worker representatives are elected
by all the employees) but can also be associated with trade union bodies (e.g., worker rep-
resentatives are usually elected from competing candidates on trade unions lists). Hence,
in Italy, union and employee representation are entrusted to a single body (single-channel
representation), as opposed to a dual-channel system, where union delegates operate along-
side works councils.12 Italian labor law makes it clear that setting up such representation
bodies is at the initiative of a firm’s employees, typically with moderate set-up costs and
with an operational support that the territorial structures of the union confederations are
always able and willing to provide. Worker representatives are able to negotiate at the plant
level on issues delegated from the industry-wide level, and have the right to be informed and
consulted. Unions and workers’ representatives may be directly involved in the shaping of
10There are no official data on the diffusion and content of decentralized bargaining. Survey data suggest
that the coverage is at around 60 percent of employees and from 15 to 25 percent of firms (Damiani and
Ricci, 2014), with greater incidence in manufacturing and larger firms. A large fraction of second-level
agreements (over 60 percent) contain wage increases related to productivity gains, but agreements deal-
ing with workplace organizational changes, performance-based human resource management practices and
employment flexibility are not uncommon, and broadly cover the remaining 40 percent of cases.
11Decentralized agreements are only supplementary to, and applicative of, the NCLAs. The possibility of
opting-out or derogating from NCLAs was formally introduced only recently, beyond the sample period we
analyze.
12There is also an alternative plant-level union body (Rappresentanza Sindacale aziendale, RSA) elected
by the members of a particular union. RSUs have tended to replace RSAs, which are usually found in
smaller companies and in certain sectors like banking.
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the firm’s labor organization and hiring policies through participation at firm-level specific
agreements on issues not already covered by NCLAs. Union influence may also be exerted
through more informal consultation and involvement practices. This channel is likely to
be relevant at the productive-unit level, where workers representatives interact with middle
level managers (especially for small-medium size firms).
3. Methodology
3.1. Technical efficiency & bias correction
In the present paper, we adopt a semi parametric approach using Data Envelopment
Analysis, and its bias corrected version, to compute efficiency scores for a large sample of
Italian firms operating in the manufacturing sector. The main advantage of using DEA
is that it is not required to specify a form for the technology representing the production
process, so that no assumptions are made for the shape of the production frontier. Moreover,
DEA allows to compute a simple inefficiency measure also for a technology involving multiple
outputs and multiple inputs: the frontier is directly derived from the data and all firms in
the sample are evaluated through input or output distance functions13. We use an output-
oriented approach that maximizes output levels given the present input bundle, because
it is more suited for the second stage analysis. Let x = (x1, ..., xN) ∈ RN+ be inputs and
y = (y1, ..., yM) ∈ RM+ be outputs, and suppose they are both freely disposable. Assuming
that the output set P (x) = {(y, x) : x can produce y} is closed and convex, the standard
and general DEA efficiency score can be defined as:
λDEA(x0, y0) = sup{λ | λy0 ∈ P (x0)}
Empirically, it can be estimated via linear programming through λˆDEA(x0, y0), by solving
K linear programs, one for each firm in the sample. Following the Variable Return to Scale
13For a detailed treatment of DEA, see Cooper et al., (2007).
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model proposed by Banker et al., (1984):
λˆDEA(x0, y0) = maxλ (1)
s. t. x0 ≥
K∑
k=1
zkXk,
λy0 ≤
K∑
k=1
zkYk;
zk ≥ 0;
K∑
k=1
zk = 1,
where k indicates decision making units (DMUs) and X and Y are matrices of inputs and
outputs. One of the main disadvantages of this deterministic approach is the absence of a
stochastic error component. In fact, λˆDEA are biased by construction and overestimate the
true technical efficiency level. Following Simar and Wilson (1998), the BIAS can be defined
as:
BIAS(λˆDEA(x0, y0)) = E(λˆDEA(x0, y0))− λDEA(x0, y0) (2)
where λDEA(x0, y0) represents the true unknown technical efficiency score. An estimate of
the BIAS can be obtained using the homogeneous bootstrap method proposed by Simar and
Wilson (1998), which assumes that the true production set boundaries lie to the left and
above the piecewise linear frontier. The bias corrected DEA scores can therefore be derived
as follows:
ˆˆ
λDEA(x0, y0) = λˆDEA(x0, y0)− ˆBIASB(λˆDEA(x0, y0)) (3)
The corrected efficiency scores in the output-oriented format are bounded below by 1, a
value that cannot be reached due to the correction procedure. Therefore, values near to 1
represent the most efficient firms in the sample, in terms of combining inputs in order to
obtain output.
3.2. Truncated regression model and empirical strategy
Explaining efficiency scores trough a classical regression model can be problematic for
the unclear nature and the complex data generating process behind such scores. In their
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seminal paper, Simar and Wilson (2007) underline a complicated correlation structure for
the residuals, and show the bias of the estimates performed using OLS or Tobit models,
suggesting an estimation model that takes into account the truncated nature of the DEA
scores. In particular, they recommend using a truncated regression model, to be estimated
via Maximum Likelihood. In this paper, we use exactly that methodology, so that the
empirical specification of the truncated regression is as follows:
ˆˆ
λDEA(x0, y0) = γwk + εk ≥ 1, k = 1, ...K (4)
where wk represents a set of explanatory variables, and
ˆˆ
λDEA(x0, y0) is the vector of estimated
efficiency scores specific for each year. The application of Algoritm #2 by Simar and
Wilson (2007), to which we refer for any further details, can be resumed in a step
by step procedure based on bootstrap and aimed at obtaining more robust and
reliable confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients. Applications of such
method on large samples are still scarce. Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006) apply it to a sample of
160 heterogeneous firms operating in different sectors, with the main aim of investigating,
in the second stage, the influence of ownership and size on firm technical efficiency. Benito
et al. (2014) use the truncated regression model to explain inefficiency of a large sample of
Spanish municipal firms, while Falavigna and Ippoliti (2012) use it to analyze the efficiency
of Italian hospitals over time. Biener et al. (2016) investigate the determinants of efficiency
in the Swiss insurance sector including many firm’s characteristics as covariates, focusing
on leverage and international diversification. However, the most recent developments in the
field, see for example Simar and Wilson (2011) or Baˆdin et al. (2012), highlight that the
application of the truncated regression is valid only if the separability condition between the
input-output space, used in the DEA phase, and the space of environmental variables w (i.e.
external factors w that do not influence the shape of the frontier) holds. If the separability
does not hold, the interpretation of the coefficients from the truncated regression becomes
difficult, and the precision of estimates decreases as well. Since a clear empirical test on the
separability condition is currently unavailable (Zschille, 2015), we include variables that, for
the most part, are pretty standard in the literature of technical efficiency and for which the
12
separability assumption appears acceptable. Moreover, these variables can be reasonably
considered external to the production process, influencing the inefficiency level but not the
technical relationship between inputs and outputs.
3.3. Endogeneity issues
Concerning our two main variables of interest, the relationship of unions or DLCAs with
technical efficiency may be potentially endogenous, e.g. if the best performing firms are also
those in which unions or decentralized contracts are more likely to be present.
Endogeneity problems may be relevant for DLCA, because it is the firm itself that chooses
to sign decentralized contracts, and that choice can be influenced by specific firms’ or work-
force’s characteristics, which may also be related to efficiency performances. We try to solve
this problem in two different ways. The first one is through the inclusion of additional
control variables in the truncated regression model, to account for firm heterogeneity. The
controls used are relatively standard and have already been used in previous works in the
field (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Latruffe et al., 2008; Zelenyuk and Zheka, 2006; Bruno
and Manello, 2015), so that we are relatively confident on the validity of the separability
condition. In particular, we include controls for the size and the structure of firms, generally
aimed at capturing the effect of scale economies or vertical integration, for the characteristics
of the workforce (percentage of young workers, blue-white collars), as well as geographical
and sectoral dummies.
The second way is more novel in the field of efficiency analysis. We try to remove
any remaining endogeneity bias of the contract status’ effect on efficiency by applying the
propensity score based method proposed by Card and De La Rica (2006), in turn based
on the results by Imbens (2004). In particular, the method is aimed at eliminating, or at
least reducing, the bias that may arise if the presence of decentralized contracts is influenced
by observed and unobserved firm-specific and worker heterogeneity. The approach requires
that a first-stage model for the presence of DLCA is preliminarily estimated on a rich set of
observed firm’s and workforce’s characteristics; a polynomial in the fitted probability (i.e.,
the propensity score for each firm) is then inserted among the explanatory variables (which
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already include the DLCA dummy) in the main regression used to explain the efficiency
scores. Accordingly, we estimate the probability of adopting a decentralized contract through
a Probit model, and we include the fitted probability, and its squared and cubed terms,
as additional regressors in the Simar-Wilson truncated regression model. Essentially, the
procedure amounts to controlling for the observed firm-level and workforce heterogeneity
in a parsimonious but highly flexible way, thereby also minimizing biases from unobserved
heterogeneity.14
Endogenity problems for workplace unionization are also relevant in principle; however,
they need not be of practical concerns in our application. Indeed, the structure of firm-
level representativeness in Italy seems to partially guarantee that union organizations do
not systematically select the best firms. As discussed by Breda (2015), the motivation
can be traced to the underlying institutional mechanisms for setting up firm-level union
representation bodies. In particular, in many countries of continental Europe the presence
of unions is typically based upon the initiative of single employees and their willingness
to become worker representatives, without the need for large initial investments by the
candidate union.15 As a result, the probability of observing union’s representation at the
firm level becomes quasi-random, specially after major sources of firm heterogeneity (e.g.,
size, industry and firm past profitability) are already controlled for.16 Breda (2015) argues
that this is indeed the case for France. Because of the substantial similarities in the Italian
and French systems of industrial relations, we believe these arguments can be used to discard
concerns of large endogeneity biases in the estimated union effect. Nevertheless, in an
attempt to further reducing any such biases, in some of the specifications discussed below
we will also rely on the propensity score method for the workplace unionization variable.
14This is more likely to happen whenever the omitted unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the
included observed heterogeneity, and points to the importance of using - as we do in section 5.3 - a rich
specification for the propensity score.
15E.g., unlike the US, a union does not have to obtain the majority of a firm’s workforce in a Certification
Election to gain firm-level representation and bargaining rights; it only need find a worker who is willing
to act as a representative within the firm. This significantly reduces the need to incur in large monetary
disbursements and other set-up costs by the candidate union.
16These aspects represent a deep difference with respect to other countries, where unions target most
profitable and best performing firms (Brown et al., 2009).
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4. Data
We use a large and representative sample of Italian firms (both corporations and general
partnerships) drawn from the ISFOL’s Employer and Employee Survey (RIL)17. The survey
contains detailed information on each firm’s labor force, industrial relations, investment
and innovation activities. For our analysis, we focus on a sample of manufacturing firms
drawn from the 2010 RIL survey, which contains rich information on the use of decentralized
bargaining and of specific PRP schemes. The RIL survey, however, do not include reliable
balance sheet data, which had to be recovered from another data sources Since each firm
is identified by a tax code, we merged the RIL-ISFOL dataset with the AIDA dataset
provided by Bureau Van Dijk, which contains detailed financial and economic data for all
Italian corporations18. Inputs and outputs used in the DEA model, both derived by direct
observation from balance-sheets, can be considered as reliable and representative of the real
financial/economic position of the firm, as required by the law, but are less precise than
physical quantities.
For this reason, we are particularly aware of the presence of possible outliers, which can
cause instability in the solution of linear programs, so that a deep cleaning of the data is
required. To be more specific, we firstly separate each two-digit ATECO2007 sector, so as
to compare firms with a homogeneous technology (Daraio and Simar, 2005). Secondly, we
compute rough indicators of labor productivity (Value of Production/Labor Costs) and of
mechanization (Physical Assets/Labor Costs). For each sub-sector, we only keep firms laying
between the 1-99 percentiles. This procedure is aimed at eliminating firms with unreliable
balance sheet data. Moreover, we follow the method proposed by Simar (2003), to eliminate
the remaining additional outliers19. The final sample includes 3,450 manufacturing firms
which are classified in 20 homogeneous technologies, for which DEA models are computed
17ISFOL stands for the Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of Workers, a national
research institute that reports directly to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and provides support to
the central government and local authorities
18The cost of the merging is a loss in terms of number of firms, because in Italy only limited liabilities
companies (SPA or SRL) are compelled to register balance sheet data.
19Outliers are mainly present in two sectors: Printing (code 18) and Repairing and maintenance (code
33).
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separately by using a three-inputs and one-output technology. As to the inputs, fixed capital
(K) has been proxied by the total assets net of depreciation and amortizations, labor (L)
has been proxied by total labor costs (to overcome problems due to the identification of the
number of full time equivalent workers and to the difference in the quality of the workforce),
while intermediate goods (M), have been proxied by raw material costs net of inventories
changes. The latter input, uncommon in this kind of analysis, has been included because the
output considered (Y ) is the total value of production (revenues net of change in inventories),
instead of value added. The motivation relies in the economic and financial crisis, which
after 2008 had the effect of reducing value added to small (and sometimes negative) values.
All financial variables have been deflated according to specific deflators provided by the
national statistics institute (ISTAT). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the inputs
and output variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for inputs and output (year 2010)
N. Firms Inputs (103 euros) Output (103 euros)
Interm. goods Labor costs Capital Value of production
Food 456 17,831 3,537 7,971 32,540
Beverages 71 21,293 3,668 11,201 43,886
Textiles 140 8,713 4,043 5,032 20,030
Clotings 118 11,981 3,572 3,594 28,623
Leather products 93 13,179 3,522 2,888 28,963
Wood 100 2,174 928 2,235 4,641
Paper 78 13,896 3,439 9,143 24,062
Printing 89 1,943 1,148 2,096 5,233
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 122 67,836 12,371 24,737 115,872
Rubber products 141 18,692 5,338 7,952 32,172
Mineral products 253 5,151 2,615 7,480 13,856
Metallurgy 64 73,873 8,073 24,450 97,892
Metal products 384 3,755 1,806 2,881 8,518
Computers and elctronics 91 9,047 6,478 8,024 22,540
Electrical appliances 122 21,957 6,464 5,445 39,399
Machinery 389 13,349 4,281 3,874 25,477
Automotive and equipments 85 49,809 19,027 16,429 103,098
Furniture 350 3,975 1,496 2,557 8,321
Other manufacturing industries 190 4,727 1,245 1,276 8,443
Repair and maintenance 114 2,616 1,830 1,160 9,348
Total 3450 14,167 3,888 6,151 26,801
Larger firms operate in Chemicals, Automotive and Metallurgy, while smaller firms in
Wood and Printing. From a first analysis of the raw data, we notice that different com-
binations of capital and labor are used in different industries, motivating the computation
of technical efficiency scores rather than labor productivity measures. In fact, DEA scores
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are computed considering the whole input bundle (capital, labor and intermediate goods)
and separating different technologies (sectors), making them more precise than a simple
output-input ratio. For example, as expected, the incidence of capital assets on revenues
changes from around 15% for the automotive industry to 20% and 25% in the Chemicals
and Metallurgy industries, respectively.
Table 2: Number of firms with unions and decentralized contracts
Unionized Not Unionized Total sample
Decentralized LCA 612 87 699
Collective LCA 492 2259 2751
Total sample 1104 2346 3450
Our industrial relation variables of interest, as well other aspects related to
the workforce, innovation and firms’ internationalization, are obtained from the
2010 RIL Survey. Specifically, we created a dummy variable indicating whether workers
have established any form of workers representation at the workplace (RSU or RSA) that
is legally entitled to participate in the firm-level bargaining process. As shown in Table
2, such a workplace representation is present in one third of the sample (1,104 firms). We
also created a dummy variable indicating whether the firm and the unions have signed a
decentralized labor agreement. As reported in Table 2, this occurs in 20% of the cases
(699 firms). Among firms characterized by the presence of decentralized labor contracts,
more than 90% adopt a PRP scheme, which remains one of the primary clauses discussed
and bargained at the firm level. However, as shown in Table 3, its introduction is mainly
pursued in a collective form (60% adopt PRP only in collective form, 28% propose a mix
of individual and collective PRP, and only 7% declare a wage integration entirely linked to
individual performance). This suggests that Italian unions tend to avoid the use of individual
incentive schemes or, even more, dislike the individual monitoring of performances.
While our industrial relation variables are obtained from the 2010 RIL, we use
firms’ balance sheet data for the period 2010-2012 for our DEA computations.
We do so for three main reasons. First, by pooling a firm’s balance sheet data
over a three year period, we aim at increasing the statistical efficiency of our
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Table 3: PRP schemes among firms adopting a DLCA
PRP scheme N. firms
Collective 408
Collective & individual 184
Only individual 50
Firms adopting PRP 642
second stage analysis (truncated regression phase), and minimize the impact
of short-term fluctuations and measurement errors in single-year balance sheet
entries. Second, we believe that the impact of unions and DLCA on firms’
performance is hardly contemporaneous; more likely, it takes time to emerge
and has some persistence over time. Notice that the RIL Survey 2010 portrays
the firm’s situation at the end of 2009; then the 2010 performance (based on
data at the end of the year), and subsequent years, should be influenced by the
presence of unions/DLCAs. Finally, the fact that union and contracting status
are lagged for the period 2010-2012 will further reduce endogeneity concerns
that we have already discussed.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Efficiency results
Efficiency scores have been estimated using both R and the package FEAR (Wilson,
2008). The estimation has been performed separately for each year and for the 20 Ateco
2-digit codes. For each manufacturing activity, the bias correction method (based on the
homogenous bootstrap procedure described in Simar and Wilson, 1998) has been applied
separately, by running 2000 replications. The results are reported in Table 4. The efficiency
scores are bounded below by 1, a value that cannot be reached by fully efficient firms when
the bias correction mechanism is implemented. Since the orientation of the DEA model
is on outputs, each score can be interpreted as the potential increase in output obtainable
if input bundles are combined efficiently. Notice the relatively high values of the average
and median scores, which is largely due to the financial nature of data, by definition not so
homogeneous also for firms operating in the same industry. Given that the DEA programs
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have been run separately for each sectoral sub-sample, the average and median efficiency
scores relative to each industry cannot be immediately compared20. This is another reason
in favor of the estimation of a truncated regression, which is able to eliminate, through the
inclusion of sector dummies, the specific effect of each different reference frontier.
Table 4: Bias corrected efficiency scores, computed sector by sector
Industry 2010 2011 2012
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Food 1.682 1.680 1.637 1.580 1.659 1.592
Beverages 1.535 1.484 1.538 1.513 1.711 1.683
Textiles 1.926 1.919 2.061 1.982 2.042 1.954
Clothing 2.646 2.250 2.170 2.057 2.292 2.071
Leather products 1.677 1.616 1.831 1.715 1.782 1.743
Wood 1.459 1.430 1.520 1.429 1.500 1.470
Paper 1.350 1.300 1.388 1.334 1.330 1.281
Printing 2.643 2.244 2.625 2.173 2.404 2.127
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 1.935 1.865 1.949 1.869 1.936 1.882
Rubber products 1.396 1.354 1.379 1.350 1.487 1.470
Mineral products 1.944 1.802 2.037 1.968 2.170 1.924
Metallurgy 1.321 1.263 1.297 1.237 1.321 1.267
Metal products 2.242 2.118 2.393 2.178 2.016 1.902
Computers and electronics 1.803 1.701 1.827 1.648 1.837 1.784
Electrical appliances 2.038 1.835 1.709 1.643 1.905 1.813
Machinery 2.046 1.978 1.746 1.711 1.688 1.641
Automotive and equipments 1.546 1.503 1.362 1.309 1.374 1.344
Furniture 1.924 1.790 1.924 1.853 1.931 1.861
Other manufacturing industries 1.792 1.741 1.703 1.633 1.883 1.789
Repair and maintenance 3.251 2.542 2.046 1.983 1.845 1.840
Total 1.940 1.771 1.860 1.723 1.838 1.719
According to the figures reported in Table 4, there appears to be a substantial stability
of heterogeneity among firms over time: on average, all firms in the sample remain at a
rather constant distance from the specific yearly-estimated frontier. The highest values of
inefficiency scores, both in term of mean and median, are recorded in 2010, the worse year
in terms of economic cycle. A reducing distance from the frontier suggests that the most
disadvantaged firms (i. e. the followers) get closer to the best performers, which are lying
on the frontier. Another important aspect is that the efficiency estimates are not much
correlated to the number of observations relative to each manufacturing activity, so that our
20The indicators collected in Table 4 can only be interpreted as measures of the heterogeneity of the
sub-sample in relation to its specific best-practice frontier.
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cleaning procedure appears to have been quite effective in eliminating outliers. The relative
heterogeneity among firms (i.e. the average distance from their respective frontiers) is lower
in Metallurgy, Paper, Rubber, Wood and Automotive, even if in this latter case there is a
remarkable difference between 2010 and 2012. The recent crisis has been particularly strong
for the automotive sector, substantially reducing the number of cars produced in Europe
and particularly in Italy; 2010 was indeed a year of low production with an important share
of idle capacity. The inefficiency score recorded for 2010 (1.55) and the improvement in the
subsequent years suggests that the situation has become more favorable also for followers
firms operating in the automotive supply chain. A similar comment applies to the Machinery
sector and to the Repair and Maintenance industry, which are both strictly linked to the
economic cycle. The most heterogeneous sectors, where highly efficient firms co-exist with a
larger plethora of less efficient units are Clothings, Printings, Metal and Mineral products,
traditional activities that typically exhibit lower rates of technological progress.
5.2. Second stage phase
We turn now towards the investigation of the effect of industrial relations and labor
contract characteristics on technical efficiency, and apply the truncated regression model
depicted in section 3. We use a homogeneous bootstrap procedure, repeating each truncated
regression 200 times. In order to increase the robustness of our results, we replicate estimates
under 7 different model specifications, including additional control variables. In all the
reported estimates, the dependent variable is an efficiency score computed separately for
each year and sector; time dummies are included to control for year specificity similarly to
Biener et al. (2016). The results are reported in Table 6. Given the nature of the efficiency
scores, proxing a distance from the reference frontier, a negative sign indicates a positive
effect on efficiency. Our empirical strategy is based on the estimation of the truncated
regression over the whole sample, where a set of dummies catch the sectoral fixed effect,
shifting efficiency estimates according to each specific reference frontier.
The two main aspects of interest are investigated through dummies: the first indicates
firms adopting decentralized labor contract agreements (DLCAs), the second identifies firms
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for second stage variables, 2010
Variables Definition Mean SD
Size Logarithm of employees 3.30 1.32
Size Squared Square of size 12.62 10.37
Firm’s age Number of years from foundation 25.15 15.53
Vertical Dis-integration External costs over total costs 0.71 0.14
Graduated employees (%) Share of graduated employees 0.06 0.10
Young employees (%) Share of young employees 0.24 0.23
White collar (%) Share of white collar employees 0.31 0.21
Export (% of revenues) Share of export over revenues 0.23 0.29
Unionization rate Share of unionized workers 0.16 0.21
Dummies
Employees training 1 if the firms offers traning 43%
Patents 1 if the firm registers patents (2007-2010) 12%
North-West Italy 1 if the firm is located in North-West 35%
North-East Italy 1 if the firm is located in North-East 31%
Center Italy if the firm is located in Center 18%
South Italy if the firm is located in South or in the Islands 16%
where unions are present. We have included a set of time variant controls from the AIDA
dataset (i.e. size, size squared, degree of vertical dis-integration) and a set of time invariant
controls (i.e. regional and sectoral dummies, characteristics of managers, export share,
labor force composition, innovation). Those variables appear gradually along the estimates
in order to test the robustness and the stability of the results. Table 5 lists the full set of
explanatory variables.
The impact on efficiency is positive for decentralized contracts and negative for unions,
and coefficients are always significant and with a magnitude which remains substantially
stable across the different model specifications, even when the most complete set of control
variables is included (model 4, our baseline specification). In particular, considering the
presence of unions, the average level of inefficiency increases by 0.137-0.162 in magnitude,
which corresponds to a 14-16% increase of the average inefficiency level in 2010 (1.940), the
baseline year. The effect of adopting a DLCA seems somewhat less stable across model
specifications, increasing the efficiency indicator by 0.109-0.171 (11% - 17% of the average
inefficiency). The above findings for unions are in line in terms of magnitude (18% for labor
productivity and 13% for TFP) with Morikawa (2010), even if the sign is the opposite, while
the results for DLCA are similar, in terms of sign and magnitude (20%), to those reported
by Addison et al. (2015), even if their left hand side variable is labor productivity.
The positive effect of DLCA remains slightly lower than the negative effect of unions,
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with the exception of model 1. This suggests that, once the collective voice option has been
formally recognized, the negative effect of the unions’ monopoly face is almost completely
compensated. Thanks to a better mix of organizational flexibility, wage incentives and a
clearer definition of the union’s role, aspects on which both the employees and the managers
agree in written form through the stipulation of a DLCA, the drawbacks linked to union
activity are largely overcome and minimized. On the contrary, when the unions operating
within the firm are unable or unwilling to (pre-)commit on well defined terms on such issues
as labor organization, wage claims, cooperation with the management and internal conflicts
smoothing, the detrimental effect on efficiency becomes more evident and the monopoly face
of unions more likely to prevail, as argued by Kaufman (2004).
In the rest of this section, we briefly discuss the estimates for the remaining control
variables, and report on the results of a number of robustness checks. The effect of size has
been carefully considered. First, we include a dummy to isolate the effect on efficiency of
small sized firms (up to 15 workers), for which the presence of unions and the adoption of
DLCA is relatively rare21; the effect of such a dummy is, however, never significant across
all the specifications. Secondly, we include the logarithm of the number of employees and its
square, in order to test for the presence of a non linear effect. As expected, and consistently
with previous research dealing with DEA efficiency scores (Latruffe et al, 2008; Zelenyuk and
Zheka, 2006), the effect of size on efficiency is positive and stable across models, but up to a
certain dimensional threshold, after which it becomes negative, as shown by the positive and
significant coefficient on the squared term. This suggests that, when their size becomes too
large, firms suffer from organizational complexity and coordination inefficiencies. The age
of the firm, proxing its stability over time, shows a negative impact on technical efficiency,
suggesting that younger firms are more apt to take advantage from technical progress. This
evidence is probably linked to the issue of firm’s maturity, which reduces the openness to new
and risky technological innovation. The geographical location matters and shifts the average
level of technical efficiency in favor of northern Italian regions, given that the reference group
21Firms employing less than 15 employees are also subject to softened employment protection legislation,
as specified by the Italian Workers’ Statute stipulated in 1970.
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is represented by southern regions and islands.
Time invariant control variables catching workforce characteristics like education (share
of graduated), age (share of young employees) and main task (share of white collars), in-
troduced in regressions 3 and 4, show mixed results and do not seem to deeply influence
technical efficiency. However, when a firm invests in training activities for employees, the
effect on efficiency becomes positive and significant. This last set of variables, based on
the RIL survey, refer to the end of 2009, but can be considered as proxies for the long
run characteristics of the firm. Firms exporting intensively show better performances in
terms of efficiency, as well as firms that patent during the last three years. Both aspects,
export and innovation capacity, are two classical features of highly productive firms and
this relationship is also confirmed regarding technical efficiency. Finally, the level of vertical
dis-integration, measured as the ratio of external costs over total costs, accounts for differ-
ences in outsourcing strategies and vertical boundaries and shows a strongly positive impact
on technical efficiency. This result suggests that outsourcing represents a valid instrument
for increasing productivity levels, and is consistent with the results of Pieri and Zaninotto
(2013) and Manello et al. (2015).
Additional estimates have been run as robustness checks and the aforementioned evi-
dence, in particular for what concerns the two main variables of interest, is substantially
confirmed. Specifically, when we include an interaction term between unions and DLCA, the
results are unchanged and the interaction variable remains not significant, highlighting the
compensation effect of DLCA on the negative role of unions. Moreover, we run additional
regressions, using size-class dummies, without significant changes in the main conclusions.
Similarly, when we estimate separated truncated regression models excluding the 2010 year
to reduce simultaneity concerns with unions or DLCA, the main findings remain virtually
unchanged.22 Our results are also stable, in terms of sign and statistical significance, when
one of the two variable of interest (unions or DLCA) is omitted, but the estimates are deeply
downward biased: the single coefficient partially captures the effect on each variable, loosing
22These additional results are not reported in the paper, but they are available upon request.
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the real trade-off between the two effects, as reported in models 5 and 6.
The last column of table 6 includes the unionization rate, a proxy of the union’s power
within the firm. The main findings remain the same, with an effect of DLCA substantially
stable, and confirm a negative impact of unions on efficiency, but a strong relation between
unions’ power and technical efficiency emerges. Per se, the presence of unions reduces by 0.09
(8%) the average efficiency score, but the effect becomes even more negative as the percentage
of unionized workers in the firm increases. This aspect will be further investigated in the
following sections.
Finally, we fully exploit the information on the nature of PRP schemes (collective, in-
dividual, or mixed) introduced through the DLCA. The general result is that estimates are
substantially robust to the inclusion of dummies accounting for the type of PRP schemes
(models 8 through 11), while the new regressors are not found to influence the observed
efficiency level, highlighting that, rather than wage settings it is the whole spectrum of con-
tractual clauses that matters for efficiency. Results from those estimates are reported in
Appendix A.
5.3. Controlling for the probability of DLCA’s adoption
The presence of firm-specific aspects that influence the probability of signing a DLCA can
introduce potential bias in the estimated positive effect from such contracts. As previously
discussed, we try to solve the problem by introducing a low order polynomial function of
the predicted probability of adopting a decentralized contract at firm level, following the
methodology proposed by Card and De La Rica (2006). The main advantage is that all the
relevant information from additional workforce’s and firm’s characteristics are condensed in
a one-dimensional indicator that flexibly and parsimoniously controls for such additional
variables and their interactions. We run a Probit model on the probability of observing
DLCA at the firm level using as covariates the fraction of female and temporary workers,
the share of educated and young employees, the incidence of white-blue collars, the share
of employees trained on the job, firm’s size and age, and past average profitability levels 23.
23We use Return on Sales averaged for the period 2007-2009 as a proxy of past profitability. If financial
data are missing for previous periods, we use the 2010 value.
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Finally, we include controls for regions and sectors. The predicted probability, along with
its square and its cube, have been included as additional regressors in the Simar-Wilson
truncated regression model to partial out the effect on technical efficiency attributed to the
potentially higher ex-ante probability of signing DLCA for some firms.
Table 7: Propensity score value added in the Simar-Wilson truncated regression
VARIABLES p-score on DLCA p-score on Unions
Unions 0.147*** 0.123***
(0.0672 - 0.227) (0.0387 - 0.207)
DLCA -0.102* -0.101**
(-0.209 - 0.00432) (-0.188 - -0.0144)
Propensity score 1.864** 1.446**
(0.306 - 3.422) (0.0769 - 2.815)
Propensity score squared -5.496*** -2.232
(-9.084 - -1.909) (-5.052 - 0.587)
Propensity score cubed 4.188*** 0.914
(1.725 - 6.651) (-0.953 - 2.782)
Observations 10,350 10,350
Chi-square 432.2 436
Log Lik -7102 -7104
Confidence Interval 0.95% in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Even if
not reported, we include the same variables from model 4 of table 6.
The results from table 7 once again confirm the robustness of our main findings. In
comparison to our baseline model (table 6, model 4), the estimated coefficient for DLCA
obtained with the propensity score based method decreases approximately by 20% (from
-0.124 to -0.102), in line with what reported by Card and De La Rica (2006) for their
application. The coefficients for the remaining variables24, as well as for the presence of
unions, remain substantially stable when the propensity score terms are included. Therefore,
even after controlling for the ex-ante probability of adopting decentralized contracts (which
partially solve the endogeneity issues), the effective presence of DLCA shows a positive
and significant effect on efficiency (10%). A similar procedure has also been applied for
the presence of unions, by estimating a probit model that uses the same covariates listed
above. The results of column 3 show that the inclusion of propensity score terms reduces
the estimated coefficient on the dummy of interest, that remains positive and significant,
with stable results also for other variables. In both the case of DLCAs and unions, therefore,
adding the propensity scores terms leaves the main messages unchanged.
24Those coefficients are not reported here for simplicity, but are available upon request.
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5.4. Extensions: the role of international trade, debt and assets’ rigidity
As shown in the previous sections, the presence of unions in the workplace has a signifi-
cant negative influence on efficiency, which is virtually compensated whenever a decentral-
ized labor contract agreement has been formally stipulated between the managers and the
workers’ representatives. However, the relative power of unions may be drastically different
according to firms’ characteristics or to some specific strategies pursued by firms. Previ-
ous literature highlights three main channels through which unions can suffer a substantial
limitation of their power: exposure to international markets, low degree of capital sunk-
ness/rigidity and high levels of debt. These three aspects have been extensively investigated
by empirical papers, also recently, but the main focus has been on labor outcomes (such as
wage differentials) or on firms financial outcomes (such as investment or cash flows), rather
than on their role in limiting the adverse union effect on firm efficiency.
A higher exposure to international trade is expected to increase managers’ bargaining
power through the credible threat of de-localizing production activities or via the lower
mark-up in the foreign markets. Felbermayr et al. (2014) investigate the influence of ex-
port intensity on rent-sharing and find lower wages for firms more exposed to international
trade, highlighting a lower unions’ power, mainly due to the diminishing markups in foreign
markets.
Bronars and Deere (1991) argue that increasing the level of debt is a specific strategy
pursued by managers to reduce the amount of profits potentially appropriable by employees,
as well as the unions’ bargaining power before negotiation. Matsa (2010), analyzing data
on US firms for the 1970s and the 1990s, finds a significant relation between debt structure
and unions’ power, confirming that firms increase debt to limit the bargaining power of their
employees.
Finally, the so called hold-up theory suggests that, in the presence of large irreversible
investments (as in the case of sunk costs or very illiquid assets) and incomplete contracts,
the union bargaining power is higher and the firm is more vulnerable to unions’ opportunis-
tic behavior in wage negotiations, which may lead to a reduction of future investments.
Recently, Cardullo et al. (2015) provide evidence on the empirical relevance of this holdup
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problem using international sector-level data. They find a negative effect of unions’ power
on investment per worker, observing a stronger effect in sectors characterized by a higher
presence of sunk or rigid capital.
From these previous studies, we can expect a stronger bargaining power of unions when
the exposure to international trade is limited, when the invested capital is sunk or rigid and
when level of debt is not high. In such cases, the margin of negotiation with the manage-
ment is wider, so that we expect a higher (negative) impact on efficiency. The empirical
strategy is based on a pre-identification of the subset of firms in which the bargaining power
of unions should be more limited and a separate estimation of the same truncated regres-
sion model across the two groups, comparing the magnitude of the usual union-dummy
coefficient. We replicate the same procedure by dividing the sample according to the three
aforementioned aspects, and by identifying three groups, sometimes partially overlapped,
where union bargaining power is high (low).
Table 8 reports three sets of results, all based on the richest specification of Table 6
(model 4). The first part of Table 8 (columns 2 and 3) analyzes the exposure to international
trade. Firms have been divided in two groups on the basis of their export share: the median
value (30% in 2010) showed by the subset of firms involved in exporting activities has
been used as a threshold for dividing strong versus marginal exporters. The estimated
effect of unions’ presence across the two groups differ substantially. As expected, for firms
intensively (marginally) exposed to international trade, unions reduce efficiency only by 0.09
(0.15). This is consistent with the idea that, when the presence on international markets
is marginal, the threat of off-shoring is less credible and mark-ups may be higher, with a
stronger bargaining power of unions.
The second part of table 8 (columns 4-5) is focused on firms’ debt structure. The whole
sample has been divided into two groups on the basis of the leverage index, computed as
external debt over equity in 2010. Firms with a leverage higher than 1 are considered as
heavily indebted. The results confirm a lower effect of unions on inefficiency for firms with
higher leverage, 0.10 versus 0.212 for the low leverage group. Also in this case the result is
coherent with previous findings, and confirms that an higher debt exposure reduce unions’
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bargaining power and limits the negative impact on technical efficiency.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 8 are focused on the role of capital rigidity. We
use a firm-level measure of physical capital intensity, the ratio of tangible assets over total
assets. The threshold used to identify firms characterized by a rigid capital structure is the
75th percentile value, identifying the 25% of firms with more capital invested in physical
goods25. Also in the case of physical capital intensity, the effect of unions on inefficiency is
higher (0.16 versus 0.08) for the group characterized by higher rigidity.
Despite a direct causal effect of each single aspect influencing unions’ power and technical
efficiency should be identified with care for the arbitrary divisions of the sample, the sub-
stantial coherence of the estimated coefficients across different models increases the interest
of our results, and our confidence on their general validity. When the characteristics of the
firms or the managerial strategies are such that the bargaining power of unions is limited,
the effective presence of unions shows a substantially lower negative impact on technical
efficiency, with coefficients that are 40-50% lower in magnitude with respect to the ones
reported for the high unions’ power sub-samples. The positive effect of DLCA on efficiency
is mainly confirmed, even if in some cases (low debt levels and rigid assets), local agreements
fail to compensate the stronger negative effect of unions, or, more probably, estimates are
less precise due to reduced samples.
Overall, our results suggest that, while workplace unionization decreases efficiency, fac-
tors limiting unions’ bargaining power, such as higher exposure to international markets,
higher debt and flexible assets, reduce this detrimental effect. That evidence is in line with
our finding reported in table 6 column 7, which show how unions supported by a small
number of members (i.e. the unionization rate within the firm is low) have a more limited
effect on technical efficiency.
25The 75th percentile corresponds to a ratio equal to 0.4. When using the median of the distribution
(0.23) to separate the two groups we obtain very similar results.
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6. Concluding remarks
Despite a huge theoretical and empirical literature, the relationship between unions and
productivity remains vague, with numerous contributions supporting both positive and neg-
ative effects. The conflicting results partly reflect institutional, country and sector specifici-
ties, as well as the methodology used to measure productivity and estimate the impact of
unions. We contribute to this debate by proposing one of the first applications of efficiency
analysis to labor economics issues, investigating the effect of unions and decentralized bar-
gaining on technical efficiency. In particular, we adopt a semi-parametric DEA approach for
estimating efficiency scores on a large sample of Italian firms operating in the manufacturing
sector. We devote specific attention to compare firms that adopt similar technologies by run-
ning 20 separate frontiers and by analyzing efficiency scores through a truncated regression
model.
Our main result is that the presence of unions within the firm represents a source of
inefficiency that can be reduced or almost neutralized through the adoption of decentralized
labor contract agreements. We view these findings as evidence that the negative union
effect, which remains significant and stable across all the robustness checks implemented,
strongly prevails where unions are present in the firm without a formal commitment (i.e.,
the adoption of a DLCA) to limit its conflictual/monopoly face with the management.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that the relative power of unions plays an important role
too. After having classified firms according to their differential exposure to international
trade, degree of external debt or rigidity of the capital invested, all factors limiting the
unions’ bargaining power, we find that the negative effect of unions is much lower for strong
exporters, highly leveraged firms and for firms with more flexible assets.
Our findings support the view that the adoption of decentralized bargaining, which
once expressed in a formal contract may prove effective in limiting unions’ power and its
discretionary and opportunistic behavior, acts as an efficiency enhancing factor, as recently
argued also by the European Commission. On the one hand, DLCAs counterbalance the
presence of unions and reduce the risk of potential appropriations of the firm’s returns
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by its employees. On the other hand, the additional bargained flexibility introduced by
DLCAs increases the possibilities of combining inputs, and sustains technical efficiency not
only through performance related pay clauses. Both results receive additional empirical
support when a propensity score based method is combined with the truncated regression
model to deal with the possible endogeneity of unions and DLCA with respect to technical
efficiency. However, despite our attempts to reduce endogeneity issues and to support a
causal interpretation of the uncovered relationship between unions, DLCA and efficiency,
the results should be interpreted with care. For instance, methodological developments, as
well as richer data, are still needed to better deal with the potential estimation biases arising
from unobserved heterogeneity. This appears to be a promising avenue for future research
in the area of DEA efficiency analysis.
In terms of policy implications, we suspect that the current model of Italian union repre-
sentation broadly fails in supporting the collective-voice face of unionism, if internal conflicts
are not smoothed so as to create the conditions for signing decentralized contracts. In the
absence of such agreements, workplace unionization is unlikely to represent an efficiency-
enhancing factor, lead to improved industrial relations and contribute to increase reciprocal
trust and cooperation between employees and managers. In our view, policies to favor the
adoption of DLCAs should be part of the broader set of interventions aimed at reversing the
country’s long-standing productivity crisis.
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Table 9: The interaction of DLCA, PRP schemes and unions
VARIABLES (8) (9) (10) (11)
DLCA -0.116** -0.133** -0.118** -0.128***
(-0.224 - -0.00702) (-0.234 - -0.0312) (-0.212 - -0.0232) (-0.218 - -0.0384)
Unions 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.137*** 0.137***
(0.0631 - 0.232) (0.0626 - 0.232) (0.0502 - 0.223) (0.0612 - 0.212)
Individual PRP -0.0182 -0.0211
(-0.145 - 0.108) (-0.130 - 0.0880)
Collective PRP 0.0209 0.00705
(-0.104 - 0.146) (-0.118 - 0.132)
Size < 15 0.0636 0.0634 0.0493 0.0491
(-0.0259 - 0.153) (-0.0262 - 0.153) (-0.0319 - 0.131) (-0.0290 - 0.127)
Size -0.354*** -0.354*** -0.409*** -0.409***
(-0.497 - -0.211) (-0.511 - -0.197) (-0.557 - -0.261) (-0.557 - -0.261)
Size Squared 0.0163** 0.0162* 0.0309*** 0.0309***
(0.00133 - 0.0312) (-0.000325 - 0.0328) (0.0155 - 0.0463) (0.0156 - 0.0462)
Firm’s age 0.00430*** 0.00430*** 0.00388*** 0.00387***
(0.00214 - 0.00646) (0.00206 - 0.00654) (0.00185 - 0.00592) (0.00181 - 0.00594)
North - West Italy -0.370*** -0.370*** -0.285*** -0.285***
(-0.479 - -0.261) (-0.483 - -0.257) (-0.388 - -0.182) (-0.391 - -0.179)
North - East Italy -0.475*** -0.475*** -0.340*** -0.339***
(-0.608 - -0.341) (-0.618 - -0.331) (-0.460 - -0.220) (-0.453 - -0.226)
Center Italy -0.403*** -0.403*** -0.296*** -0.296***
(-0.535 - -0.270) (-0.544 - -0.261) (-0.416 - -0.176) (-0.410 - -0.181)
Graduated employees (%) -0.103 -0.103
(-0.552 - 0.346) (-0.571 - 0.365)
Young employees (%) 0.0523 0.0523
(-0.0986 - 0.203) (-0.0870 - 0.192)
Employees training -0.0794** -0.0795**
(-0.140 - -0.0185) (-0.146 - -0.0125)
White collar (%) 0.0495 0.0495
(-0.120 - 0.219) (-0.119 - 0.218)
Export (% of revenues) -0.100* -0.101*
(-0.202 - 0.00127) (-0.211 - 0.0100)
Patents -0.138*** -0.139***
(-0.227 - -0.0498) (-0.228 - -0.0491)
Vertical Dis-integration -2.055*** -2.055***
(-2.529 - -1.581) (-2.530 - -1.579)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.337*** 3.337*** 4.633*** 4.633***
(2.943 - 3.731) (2.902 - 3.772) (4.052 - 5.214) (4.050 - 5.215)
Sigma 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.895*** 0.895***
(0.774 - 1.112) (0.769 - 1.116) (0.732 - 1.057) (0.737 - 1.052)
Observations 10,350 10,350 10,350 10,350
Chi-square 158.6 139.7 170.7 262.8
Log Lik -7343 -7343 -7109 -7109
Confidence Interval 0.95% in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
37
